Who Gets the Signal?  Unauthorized Interception and Section 605 Now Section 705 of the Communications Act by Hart, Susan M.
Pace Law Review
Volume 6
Issue 3 Spring 1986 Article 3
April 1986
Who Gets the Signal? Unauthorized Interception
and Section 605 Now Section 705 of the
Communications Act
Susan M. Hart
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Susan M. Hart, Who Gets the Signal? Unauthorized Interception and Section 605 Now Section 705 of the
Communications Act, 6 Pace L. Rev. 391 (1986)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss3/3
Notes and Comments
Who Gets the Signal? - Unauthorized
Interception and Section 605 Now Section
705 of the Communications Act
I. Introduction
When broadcasting' started in 1920,2 communications regu-
lation3 was just beginning.4 As broadcasting emerged as a new
commercial use of radio transmissions,6 communications regula-
tion was adapted to meet the needs of broadcasters for the wide-
spread dissemination and reception of broadcast signals.6 Sec-
tion 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 was enacted to
guide the use of radio transmissions. 7 Section 605 makes the un-
1. Broadcasting is defined as "the dissemination of radio communications intended
to be received by the public, directly or by the intermediary of relay stations." 47 U.S.C.
§ 153(o) (1982).
2. Broadcasting was born in 1920 when Frank Conrad, a Westinghouse engineer,
started transmitting music which other ham radio operators tuned in on, and subse-
quently began making suggestions on musical selections. The Development of Video
Technology, 25 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 789, 789 (1980).
3. Communications regulation as used herein, refers generally to both the Commu-
nications Act and the rules and regulations promulgated by the Federal Communications
Commission. However, for the purposes of this Comment, the focus is on § 605, now §
705, of the Communications Act.
4. Communications regulation began with the Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat.
302 (1912). Jones & Quinlan, Broadcasting Regulation: A Very Brief History, 37 FED.
COM. L.J. 107, 107 (1985). See also infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
5. Radio transmissions were previously used for private, commercial purposes to
transmit confidential messages. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. Advanced Consumer Tech-
nology, 549 F. Supp. 14, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). In general, radio communications were origi-
nally viewed as an alternative to the telegraph. See The Development of Video Technol-
ogy, supra note 2, at 790.
6. Broadcasters were concerned that their signals reach the general public, and that
interception and reception not violate federal law. Advanced Consumer Technology, 549
F. Supp. at 19.
7. For a brief discussion of the history of § 605, see infra text accompanying notes
61-66. Although § 605 was based upon provisions in the Radio Act of 1927, for the pur-
1
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authorized reception of a radio transmission illegal, unless the
transmission is broadcast for the use of the general public.'
While section 605 remained virtually unchanged for fifty years,'
the communications industry did not.10
In 1934, broadcasting was in its infancy;1" subscription
poses of this Comment, references are made to the § 605 language used in all relevant
subscription broadcasting cases.
8. Section 605 provides:
Except as authorized by Chapter 119, Title 18, no person receiving, assisting
in receiving, transmitting, or assisting in transmitting, any interstate or foreign
communication by wire or radio shall divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning thereof, except through authorized channels
of transmission or reception, (1) to any person other than the addressee, his agent,
or attorney, (2) to a person employed or authorized to forward such communica-
tion to its destination, (3) to proper accounting or distributing officers of the vari-
ous communicating centers over which the communication may be passed, (4) to
the master of a ship under whom he is serving, (5) in response to a subpena [sic]
issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, or (6) on demand of other lawful au-
thority. No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any radio
communications and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, pur-
port, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person. No
person not being entitled thereto shall receive or assist in receiving any inter-
state or foreign communication by radio and use such communication (or any
information therein contained) for his own benefit or for the benefit of another
not entitled thereto. No person having received any intercepted radio communi-
cation or having become acquainted with the contents, substance, purport, effect,
or meaning of such communication (or any part thereof) knowing that such com-
munication was intercepted, shall divulge or publish the existence, contents, sub-
stance, purport, effect, or meaning of such communication (or any part thereof)
or use such communication (or any information therein contained) for his own
benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto. This section shall not
apply to the receiving, divulging, publishing or utilizing the contents of any ra-
dio communication which is transmitted by any station for the use of the general
public, which relates to ships, aircraft, vehicles, or persons in distress, or which is
transmitted by an amateur radio station operator or by a citizens band radio
operator.
47 U.S.C. § 605 (1982) (redesignated as § 705(a) in Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 705(a), 98 Stat, 2779, 2804 (1984)) (emphasis added).
9. Congressman Wirth, Chairman of the Telecommunications Subcommittee, re-
ferred to the new Act as "the first major revision of the Communications Act of 1934 ...
" 130 CONG. REc. H12239-40 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth).
10. Throughout this period, with the introduction of television in the late 1930's,
pay television in the 1950's, and the use of satellite transmissions in the 1960's, the com-
munications industry grew rapidly. See, e.g., TV GUIDE ALMANAc 383-404 (C.T. & P.G.
Norback ed. 1980).
11. Although the first radio broadcasting started in 1920, the early developments in
radio were all on the AM wavelength; FM broadcasting did not appear until the 1930's.
The Development of Video Technology, supra note 2, at 791. Further, the first regular
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broadcasting,1 2 which limits the reception of a broadcast signal
to paying subscribers, did not yet exist1 and was therefore not
directly addressed in section 605 of the 1934 Communications
Act.1' As subscription broadcasting became available, it was left
to the courts to determine what legal protection was available
against unauthorized interception of a subscription broadcast
signal.'5
Although subscription broadcasting systems have existed for
over thirty years, 6 subscription television services (pay televi-
sion) 1 7 have experienced explosive growth in this country during
only the last fourteen years.1 8 This growth was fostered by the
daily television schedule in the United States did not begin until 1939. TV GUIDE ALMA-
NAC, supra note 10, at 383.
12. Subscription broadcasting, as used in this Comment, refers to an alternative
form of commercial broadcasting which sells programming directly to subscribers. See L.
BROWN, THE NEW YORK TIMEs ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TELEVISION 326 (1977).
13. Although this author could find no specific date when subscription broadcasting
began, the first subscription broadcasting case, determining that an FM broadcast licen-
see could superimpose a subscription radio service on its signal, involved a station which
began subscription broadcasting in 1949. See Functional Music, Inc. v. FCC, 274 F.2d
543 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (FM licensee that had restricted its program format to background
music since 1949, and subsequently superimposed a subscription radio service, was not
restricted from offering subscription services as an FM broadcast licensee).
14. Section 605 was largely a redraft of provisions of the Radio Act of 1927. See
infra text accompanying notes 65-66. There is, however, some language in the legislative
history of the 1927 Act suggesting that some Senate members contemplated the possibil-
ity of subscription broadcasting. See Westover, Subscription Television and Section 605
of the Communications Act - The Pathology of an Antiquated Statute, 12 GOLDEN
GATE U.L. REV. 1, 5 n.17 (1982) (discussing the legislative history of the 1912 Act).
15. Courts often look to the FCC when interpreting § 605. See, e.g., American Tele-
vision & Com. Corp. v. Western Techtronics, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 617, 620 (D. Colo. 1982)
(noting the court's reliance on the FCC suggestion that subscription television is broad-
casting, citing National Subscription Television v. S & H TV, 644 F.2d 820, 825 (9th Cir.
1981); Chartwell Com. Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 1980); Orth-O-
Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672, 681-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). But, the FCC
itself noted early on that the applicability of § 605 would be decided in the courts.
KMLA Broadcast Corp. v. Twentieth Century Cigarette Vendors Corp., 264 F. Supp. 35,
41 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
16. Chartwell Com. Group v. Westbrook, 673 F.2d 459, 462 (6th Cir. 1980).
17. Pay television is an alternative form of commercial television which sells pro-
gramming directly to subscribers either over the air (for example, STV or MDS) or on
cable television. L. BROWN, supra note 12, at 326.
18. Bienstock, Theft of Service of Over-The-Air Pay TV: Are the Airwaves Free?,
FLA. B.J., Mar. 1982, at 240 (stating that the pay television industry has had explosive
growth only during the last ten years).
3
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technological advances within cable television, 9 the develop-
ment of technological alternatives to cable television - such as
subscription television (STV),20 multipoint distribution services
(MDS), 21 and the widespread use of earth stations2 2 and satel-
lites2" to transmit and receive signals.2" However, technological
advances were not restricted to the pay television industry; a
parallel industry also began to manufacture and sell equipment
designed to receive pay television signals.25 Although this paral-
lel industry depends upon the existence of pay television to sur-
vive, it is not authorized by the pay television industry, and
thus, has been deemed "signal piracy. ''2 6
"Signal piracy" has had a growing economic impact on pay
television,2 7 and as a result, pay television companies have
19. Note, National Subscription Television v. S & H TV: The Problem of Unautho-
rized Interception of Subscription Television - Are the Legal Airwaves Unscram-
bled?, 9 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 641, 643-50 (1982) (reviewing the historical development of
pay television technology).
20. STV utilizes a broadcast channel, usually a UHF station, to transmit pay televi-
sion programming during the evening hours. Although use of a broadcast channel means
that the signal can be received on a regular television set, the pay television signal is
encoded or scrambled (encrypted) so that only people with decoding equipment (such as
STV subscribers), can watch the programming in intelligible form. Bienstock, supra note
18, at 240.
21. MDS transmits pay television programming via microwave from a centrally lo-
cated transmitter. Microwave transmissions are omnidirectional (radiating in all direc-
tions), thus, anyone with the appropriate equipment (microwave antenna, down-con-
verter and power supply), located within line of sight to the transmitter can receive the
signal. MDS signals may or may not be scrambled (encrypted). Id.
22. Earth station refers to a station to transmit or receive electronic communica-
tions between earth and a space satellite. L. BROWN, supra note 12, at 129.
23. Satellite refers to a space vehicle used to relay television signals, and other com-
munications, across oceans and domestically. These vehicles are located 22,300 miles
above the equator, and are geosynchronous (travel at the same rotation speed as the
earth so that it remains "stationary"). L. BROWN, supra note 12, at 379.
24. See generally Piscitelli, Home Satellite Viewing: A Free Ticket to the Movies?,
35 FED. CoM. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1983).
25. Bienstock, supra note 18, at 241. See also Advanced Consumer Technology, 549
F. Supp. at 17.
26. Note, Receive-Only Satellite Earth Stations and Piracy of the Airwaves, 58 No-
TRE DAME L. REV. 84, 84 (1982).
27. Cable television distribution represents the largest portion of all pay television
subscribers - with a reported 29 million subscribers by year end 1984. Goldstein, Pay
Television: Threatened by an Alien, CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION - THE ESSENTIAL
1985 FIELD GUIDE TO THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Nov.-Dec. 1984, at 38. Within cable televi-
sion, the National Cable Television Association "estimates that the nationwide theft-of-
service epidemic cost the cable industry close to $165 million in 1981, $240 million in
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss3/3
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sought protection of their businesses and signals under section
605 of the Communications Act of 1934.28 In response, courts
have consistently upheld section 605 protection of pay television
signals"9 from STV, 30 MDS,3 ' and cable television.32 These cases
have upheld section 605 protection against a myriad of argu-
ments seeking to limit the protection of subscription broadcast
1982, $350 million in 1983 and is likely to exceed $600 million by the end of [1984]."
McCloskey, Cable Bill Fuels the Fight Against Pirates, CABLEVISION, Nov. 5, 1984, at 86.
Although the cable television industry figures presumably include both basic cable and
pay television channels, one pay service, Showtime/The Movie Channel, has estimated
losses of $500 million a year. See Baig, Scrambling TV Signals, FORTUNE, Nov. 11, 1985,
at 107.
28. Home Box Office, Inc. v. Pay TV of Greater N.Y., Inc., 467 F. Supp. 525, 528
(E.D.N.Y. 1979). See also Comment, Decoding Section 605 of the Federal Communica-
tions Act: A Cause of Action for Unauthorized Reception of Subscription Television, 50
U. CIN. L. REv. 362, 370 (1981). In addition, protection from signal piracy has been
sought under federal copyright law, state theft of service and unfair competition laws,
and various common law torts. See Bienstock, supra note 18, at 241. This Comment,
however, focuses on the federal interception law. For an interesting argument that the
theory of unfair competition provides an alternative to § 605 protection, see generally
Note, The Piracy of Subscription Television: An Alternative to the Communications
Law, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 935 (1983).
29. The only inconsistent case is Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F.
Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See infra text accompanying notes 92-100.
30. National Subscription Television v. S & H. T.V., 644 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1981)
(The definition of broadcasting in § 153(o) of the Communications Act does not control
the reach of § 605. The issue is whether a signal was intended for the use of the general
public.); Chartwell Com. Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1980) (Q 605 pro-
tects signals the transmitter does not intend for the use of the general public); United
States v. Westbrook, 502 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (§ 605 violation is the same
either in a civil or criminal case).
31. Movie Sys., Inc. v. Heller, 710 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1983) (crucial factor in § 605
protection is whether the transmitter intends the signals for use of the general public);
Hoosier Home Theatre, Inc. v. Adkins, 595 F. Supp. 389 (S.D. Ind. 1984) (receipt and use
of a signal not intended for the use of the general public violates § 605); United States v.
Stone, 546 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (the precedential value of the civil cases inter-
preting § 605 in a criminal proceeding was established by United States v. Westbrook,
502 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Mich. 1980)); American Television & Com. Corp. v. Western
Techtronics, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 617 (D. Colo. 1982) (Q 605 protects signals not intended
for the use of the general public); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Advanced Consumer Technol-
ogy, 549 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Q 605 was designed to protect communications
which the sender intends to restrict to limited receipt, even though equipment for unau-
thorized reception is readily available).
32. Ciminelli v. Cablevision, 583 F. Supp. 158 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)(§ 605 protects signals
not intended for the use of the general public); Cox Cable Cleveland Area, Inc. v. King,
582 F. Supp. 376 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (the fact that the signal is transmitted in a manner
that is meaningless without special equipment negates a finding that it was intended for
the use of the general public under § 605).
5
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signals based upon: 1) the unavailability of statutory protection
for subscription broadcast signals,3 3 2) public use of "public air-
waves" with immunity from liability," 3) the benefits of compe-
tition,35 4) the alleged violation of antitrust laws,36 5) the availa-
bility of technological protection for the signals,3 7  6) "free
speech" extension to the "right to receive,"' s and 7) privacy
rights of individuals.39 While the cases through 1984 upheld pro-
tection of pay television signals, some of these arguments may
warrant further consideration in the future."' In part, the con-
cern lies with questions of policy and equity - to what extent
should the interest of one industry (pay television distributors)4 1
be recognized as legally superior to that of another industry (an-
tenna, earth station and decoder manufacturers and sellers),42 or
the rights of private individuals? 43
These policy and equity considerations were highlighted
with the passage of the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984." The Cable Act significantly amended section 605, redes-
ignating and expanding section 605 into section 705 of the Coin-
33. See infra text accompanying notes 104-15. See also infra text accompanying
notes 326-30.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 337-40.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 356-57.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 358-69.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 326-30.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 341-45.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 346-49.
40. See e.g., infra text accompanying notes 281-85.
41. For purposes of this Comment, pay television distributors refers generally to
Cable Television, STV, and MDS operators and distributors (e.g. Home Box Office).
42. This industry will be collectively referred to as "signal pirates" or "pirates." See
Piscitelli, supra note 24, at 37 (concluding that imposing liability on manufacturers and
distributors of earth stations for the individual use of the equipment is at best inequita-
ble because of the possibilities for legal use of the equipment). But see infra text accom-
panying notes 354-55.
43. See Comment, Pay Television Piracy: Does Section 605 of the Federal Commu-
nications Act of 1934 Prohibit Signal Piracy - and Should It?, 10 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 531 (1984) (reviewing Movie Sys., Inc. v. Heller, 710 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1983) and
arguing against enforcement of § 605 against home viewers primarily because of privacy
rights; urging regulation of manufacturers and sellers and mandated scrambling of
signals).
44. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 was enacted on October 30, 1984.
See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 5b, 98 Stat. 2779,
2802 (1984).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss3/3
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munications Act.4 5 In addition, the Cable Act created an excep-
tion to section 705 (section 605 amended) protection, allowing
for the private viewing of any cable satellite programming that is
neither encrypted 46 nor has established a marketing system to
authorize private viewing. 7 While there has been little case law
subsequent to the adoption of these amendments, 8 at least one
court has interpreted the amendments as a dramatic shift in
policy. 4'9
Unfortunately, Congress has provided the courts with little
guidance on how to reconcile the issues of policy and equity
raised in pay television cases.50 Thus, given the highly technical
45. Section 605 was redesignated as § 705(a), and subsections 705(b)-(e) were added.
See infra notes 237-55 and accompanying text.
46. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779
(1984). See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
47. Id.
48. See infra notes 259-302 and accompanying text.
49. People v. Babylon, 39 Cal. 3d 70, 702 P.2d 205, 216 Cal. Reptr. 123, reprinted as
mod. 39 Cal. 3d 719 (1985) (although the modified decision removes the reference to new
§ 705, the remainder of the opinion is unchanged). See infra notes 292-300 and accompa-
nying text.
50. In discussing the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Senator Goldwater
said in part:
I will emphasize that nothing in section 705 is meant to foreclose consideration by
the courts of whether particular transmissions not clearly satellite cable program-
ming are considered for the use of the general public or are protected by the first
amendment and are thus exempt from the provisions of section 705.
130 CONG. REC. S14284 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Goldwater).
Further, the legislative history, as printed in the Congressional Record, says in part:
By adopting this provision there is no intention to pass judgment on any particu-
lar case that was, or was not decided under section 605 of the Communications
Act as that section presently exists (prior to this amendment). The amendments
made by this legislation are intended, however, to provide satellite cable program
suppliers in the future with two clear alternatives for the protection of their satel-
lite transmissions.
130 CONG. REC. S14287 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (explanation of § 705 as redesignated and
amended by H.R. 4103).
But see
H.R. 4103 as reported by Committee recodifies without modification § 605 to the
Communications Act of 1934 as new § 705(a). In amending existing § 605, it is
intended to leave undisturbed the case law that has developed confirming the
broad reach of § 605 as a deterrent against piracy of protected communications.
Over the years federal courts, consistent with congressional intent, have recog-
nized that § 605 provided broad protection against the unauthorized interception
of various forms of radio communications. It is the Committee's intention that the
amendment preserve these broad protections; that all acts which presently consti-
tute a violation of present § 605 shall continue to be unlawful under that section
1986]
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nature of the industry,5' the massive economic interests arrayed
on both sides of the issue, 2 and the inherent complexities of us-
ing old concepts to deal with new and ever-changing realities,
the courts are likely to be struggling with these issues for some
time to come.
This Comment will review the development of section 605
and section 705 of the Communications Act as well as the sub-
scription broadcasting cases interpreting these provisions, with
an emphasis on the arguments that have been raised to limit
subscription broadcast signal protection. This Comment con-
cludes that existing section 605 case law forms an appropriate
framework for the courts to decide future section 705 cases, in
which the courts will balance the various interests of subscrip-
tion broadcasters, "signal pirate" manufacturers/sellers, and pri-
vate individuals.
as amended and redesignated by H.R. 4103.... For example, existing § 605 pro-
vides protection against the unauthorized reception of subscription television
(STV), multipoint distribution service (MDS), and satellite communications. This
amendment ... is intended to preserve this broad reach of existing § 605 and to
make clear that all communications covered under § 605, will continue to be pro-
tected under new section 705(a).
Id. (explanation of § 705 as redesignated and amended by the House of Representatives).
See also, Lloyd, New Cable Law Takes Aim Against Pirates, N.Y.L.J. Dec. 29, 1984, at
5, col. 1.
51. See generally Note, supra note 26, at 85 (discussing the application of § 605 and
federal copyright laws to various technologies, noting that legislatures have addressed
cable television piracy, courts have addressed STV and MDS piracy, but the law as to
earth stations is unclear, and sellers often profess their legality to consumers).
52. In 1984, there were approximately 31 million pay television subscriber homes.
Goldstein, supra note 27, at 38. Assuming that each subscriber paid an average monthly
charge of only $8.00, projected annual revenues amount to $2,976 million. On the other
side, in the area of earth stations alone, there are 1.5 million Americans who own earth
stations which cost upward of $1,500 - a total investment of $2,250 million. See
Kaplan, Scrambling TV Signals From Space, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at C23, col. 1.
Further, during the last two years, sales have accelerated to an estimated 40,000-50,000
dishes sold per month, which projects to a minimum $75 million a year. This figure does
not include manufacturers of converters, microwave antennas, etc. that are used to re-
ceive non-satellite programming. Id.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss3/3
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II. Background
A. Section 605 of the Communications Act
The precursor to section 605 can be found in the Radio Act
of 1912. 53 In 1912, radio communications in the United States
consisted of "point-to-point" transmissions,54 providing an alter-
native to the telegraph. 55 Since the equipment to receive radio
signals was not widely available, 56 the main concern of commer-
cial radio communications users was the potential for unautho-
rized disclosure of the communications by someone directly in-
volved in the transmission process. 57 This concern was codified
in the Radio Act of 1912 by a provision prohibiting anyone in-
volved in, or with knowledge of, radio communications opera-
tions, from divulging or publishing any transmissions, except to
the person to whom the transmission was directed.58
When the Radio Act of 1927 was passed, 59 the prohibitions
against unauthorized publication or divulgence60 were expanded
to include the unauthorized reception or use of radio transmis-
sions."' At the same time, a proviso was added that the prohibi-
53. Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302 (1912) (current version Cable Communi-
cations Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 705(a), 98 Stat. 2779 (1984)). Regula-
tion 19 of the Act provided in part: "No person or persons engaged in or having knowl-
edge of the operation of any station or stations, shall divulge or publish the contents of
any messages transmitted or received by such station, except to the person or persons to
whom the same may be directed .... " Id. at 307.
54. "Point-to-point" radio transmissions are transmissions of electromagnetic en-
ergy sent between two points without the use of connecting wires. See The Development
of Video Technology, supra note 2, at 789-90.
55. Id.
56. Home Box Office, Inc. v. Advanced Consumer Technology, 549 F. Supp. 14, 18
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
57. Id.
58. See Westover, supra note 14, at 3. See also Advanced Consumer Technology,
549 F. Supp. at 18.
59. The Radio Act of 1927 was passed because, although the 1912 Act required li-
censing, it did not provide the power to withhold licenses and failed to address the
problems of chaos of the airwaves which were causing electronic interference. See Jones
& Quinlan, supra note 4, at 107.
60. Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302 (1912) (current version Cable Communi-
cations Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 705(a), 98 Stat. 2779, 2802).
61. Section 27, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (current version Cable Communications Policy
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 705(a), 98 Stat. 2779, 2802 (1984)) provides in relevant
part:
no person not being entitled thereto shall receive or assist in receiving any radio
9
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tions "shall not apply to the receiving, divulging, publishing, or
utilizing the contents of any radio communication broadcasted
or transmitted by amateurs or others for the use of the general
public .... ",62 Although the legislative history does not explain
this revision,63 it is reasonable to assume that, in broadening the
1912 language to include reception and use, the legislators added
the proviso exempting certain transmissions to ensure that re-
ception of the broadcasters' signals would not violate federal
law."4
Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 was based
upon the provisions in the Radio Act of 1927.65 Reports from
committees in both the Senate and House indicate that there
were no real changes between the 1927 Radio Act and section
605 of the Communications Act of 1934.88 Section 605 is there-
fore aimed at restricting the unauthorized reception of radio
communications which are not broadcast while enabling com-
mercial broadcasts to be freely received by the general public.
6 7
However, the provision did not address the possible restrictions
against the unauthorized reception of a subscription broadcast
signal which the transmitter did not intend the general public to
communication and use the same or any information therein contained for his own
benefit or the benefit of another not entitled thereto; and no person having re-
ceived such intercepted radio communication or having become acquainted with
the contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of same or any part thereof,
knowing that such information was so obtained, shall divulge or publish the con-
tents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or
use the same or any information therein contained for his own benefit or for the
benefit of another not entitled thereto: Provided, that this section shall not apply
to the receiving, divulging, publishing, or utilizing the contents of any radio com-
munication broadcasted or transmitted by amateurs or others for the use of the
general public or relating to ships in distress.
Id. at 1172 (emphasis in original).
62. Id.
63. The legislative history merely stated that § 27 was a necessary redraft of existing
law. See Westover, supra note 14, at 4 n.15.
64. See Advanced Consumer Technology, 549 F. Supp. at 19.
65. Both the Senate and House Committee reports stated that § 605 was based on §
27 of the Radio Act of 1927, although the § 27 provisions were expanded to include wire
communications. H.R. REP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934); S. REP. No. 781, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934).
66. H.R. REP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934); S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 11 (1934).
67. See Advanced Consumer Technology, 549 F. Supp. at 20.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss3/3
UNAUTHORIZED INTERCEPTION
receive." This issue was left to the courts. 9
B. The Cases Under Section 605
1. Laying the Ground Work
Although the first pay television case was not decided until
1979,70 the first subscription broadcast case, KMLA Broadcast
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Cigarette Vendors Corp.,71 was de-
cided twelve years earlier, in 1967. In KMLA, a subscription ra-
dio service providing background music to industrial and com-
mercial establishment subscribers, sought to enjoin the
manufacture, distribution, sale or use of equipment which would
receive KMLA's multiplex72 radio transmissions.7 The contro-
versy arose from Twentieth Century's provision of a background
music service at little or no charge to commercial establishments
in which their cigarette vending machines were located.7 ' This
service was provided by Twentieth Century through the installa-
tion of equipment which was designed to receive the multiplex
transmissions of KMLA and other area subscription radio ser-
75
vices, without the authorization of the subscription services.
Once the equipment was installed by Twentieth Century, the
commercial establishments could receive and use KMLA's sub-
scription radio service without paying the subscription fee.
KMLA sought a declaratory judgment, stating that its subscrip-
tion radio broadcasts constituted non-public radio communica-
tions entitled to protection from unauthorized reception under
68. See KMLA Broadcasting Corp. v. Twentieth Century Cigarette Vendors Corp.,
264 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1967) (seeking declaratory judgment that subscription radio
service transmissions were protected under § 605). See also supra notes 12-15 and ac-
companying text.
69. The FCC itself noted early on that the applicability of § 605 would be decided in
the courts. KMLA Broadcast Corp. v. Twentieth Century Cigarette Vendors Corp., 264
F. Supp. 35, 41 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
70. See infra text accompanying notes 82-84.
71. 264 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
72. A multiplex transmission involves the use of a separate subcarrier frequency,
added to a main radio broadcast frequency, which transmits or can transmit separate
musical programming on the "multiplex" channel at the same time as the main fre-
quency is broadcasting. Id. at 37.
73. Id. at 38-39.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934.78 In addition,
KMLA sought an injunction to enjoin further distribution of
Twentieth Century's unauthorized equipment. While agreeing
that KMLA had no intention of broadcasting its subscription ra-
dio service to the general public, Twentieth Century argued that
the transmission nevertheless constituted "broadcasting," '7 and
was therefore exempt from section 605 protection under the pro-
vision which excluded broadcast signals from protection.7 8 In re-
jecting Twentieth Century's argument, the court found the fact
that transmissions could not be received on conventional radios,
and were geared to commercial institution subscribers, negated
any intent by the transmitter that the signals be received by the
general public.79 Holding that the intent of the transmitter not
to broadcast the signal to the general public was determinative,
the signals were protected from unauthorized interception under
section 605.80
By focusing on the intent of the transmitter, the KMLA
court established the test for the early pay television cases. The
intent of the transmitter to have his signal received by the gen-
eral public was determinative of the issue of whether the trans-
mitter was protected under section 605 of the Communications
Act.81
2. The Beginning of Pay Television Protection
The first two pay television cases, filed under the jurisdic-
tion of section 605, were brought when Home Box Office (HBO)
terminated the contracts of two of its affiliates 2 who marketed
76. Id. at 36.
77. Section 605 provided in relevant part: "It]hat this section shall not apply to the
receiving, divulging, publishing, or utilizing the contents of any radio communication
broadcast, or transmitted by amateurs or others for the use of the general public ......
KMLA Broadcast Corp., 264 F. Supp. at 39 (quoting Communications Act of 1934). For
the definition of broadcasting under the Communications Act see supra note 1.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 42.
80. Id.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 95-100 and notes 107-15.
82. The term affiliate as used here means a party under contract to HBO (the sup-
plier), who is authorized to act as a "middleman," selling the service to individual sub-
scribers and providing the necessary interception equipment for a monthly fee. L.
BROWN, supra note 12, at 9.
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HBO through MDS systems.8 3 In these 1979 cases, decided in
adjoining districts in New York, the courts split on the issue of
whether section 605 prohibited the unauthorized reception or in-
terception of the HBO signal.8
In Home Box Office, Inc. v. PayTV of Greater N.Y., Inc.,8
HBO sought temporary and permanent injunctive relief and
damages from Pay TV's continued use of the HBO signal with-
out authorization.8 6 The case arose from the inability of HBO
and Pay TV to reach agreement on a new contract whereby Pay
TV would distribute HBO's signal in the New York City area.8 7
When Pay TV continued to distribute the HBO signal and col-
lect subscription fees without payment to HBO despite a written
demand by HBO to cease distribution, HBO brought suit alleg-
ing that Pay TV's continued distribution of the HBO signal vio-
lated section 605.88 In examining HBO's section 605 claim, the
court noted that Pay TV did not deny that section 605 prohib-
ited the unauthorized interception of the HBO signals, but
rather that Pay TV's interception of HBO's signal was author-
ized 89 because HBO consented to its interception of the signal.
The court rejected Pay TV's argument, stating that HBO's writ-
ten demand that Pay TV cease distribution of the HBO signal
clearly showed a lack of consent to Pay TV's continued intercep-
tion of HBO's signal.90 Thus, the court granted HBO's motion
for a preliminary injunction against the interception of their sig-
nal under section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934. 91
In another suit between HBO and a former affiliate, Orth-
83. Home Box Office, Inc. v. Pay TV of Greater N.Y., Inc., 467 F. Supp. 525
(E.D.N.Y. 1979); Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
84. Compare Home Box Office, Inc. v. Pay TV of Greater N.Y., Inc., 467 F. Supp.
525 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) with Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
85. 467 F. Supp. 525 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
86. Id. at 526.
87. Id. at 527.
88. Id. at 527-28. HBO also argued that Pay TV's actions violated the copyright
laws. Id. A discussion of the interface between copyright and § 605 is beyond the scope
of this Comment.
89. Id. at 528.
90. Id. at 529.
91. Id. at 529-30.
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0-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office,92 Orth-O-Vision brought suit
against HBO and other defendants alleging a conspiracy to limit
and destroy plaintiff's business because HBO refused to grant
Orth-O-Vision rights to market HBO in large areas of Queens or
grant Orth-O-Vision exclusive marketing rights in other areas.93
HBO counterclaimed, alleging that Orth-O-Vision's continued
distribution of HBO's signal, after HBO terminated its affiliate
agreement with Orth-O-Vision authorizing such a distribution
constituted unauthorized interception in violation of section
605."" In examining HBO's section 605 claim, the court stated
that the determinative issue was whether the HBO signal was
intended to be received by the general public.95 If the HBO sig-
nal was intended to be received by the general public, it would
not be protected from unauthorized reception under section
605.96 Looking to the factual record, the court found that the
HBO signal was available to anyone who paid the subscription
fee.9 7 In fact, the court noted that the intent of any subscription
service was to be available to the public.98 Furthermore, HBO's
programming content (for example, movies), was similar to con-
ventional broadcast material since it was intended to appeal to a
mass audience.9 Thus, having found that HBO intended to ap-
peal to a mass audience, and having found the mass availability
of the signal, the court denied HBO's claim for protection of its
signal under section 605 holding that the signal was transmitted
for use by the general public.100
Despite the differing conclusions on section 605 protection
of the HBO signal, neither Pay TV nor Orth-O- Vision offer sig-
nificant contributions to the development of law interpreting
section 605.
92. 474 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
93. Id. at 676-78.
94. Id. at 680-81.
95. Id. at 681.
96. Id. at 681-82.
97. Id. at 682 (citing Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regula-
tions (Radio Broadcast Services) to Provide for Subscription Television Service, 3
F.C.C.2d 1 (1966)).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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3. Defining the Scope of Protection
a. Civil Cases Against Manufacturers/Sellers
The Orth-O-Vision court left open the question of whether
all transmissions of mass appeal would be denied section 605
protection. This question was subsequently resolved in
Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook,101 the seminal
case granting section 605 protection against claims of a manufac-
turer/seller of unauthorized equipment.
In Chartwell, an STV10 2 operator sought to enjoin the sale
of electronic decoding equipment which could be used by non-
subscribers to receive STV programs. 10 3 The Chartwell court
identified two threshold questions: 1) whether the section 605
proviso removed Chartwell's transmissions from protection;' °4
and 2) whether defendants' actions constituted a violation of
section 605, and were therefore properly subject to an
injunction.10 5
In determining the reach of the section 605 proviso, the
Chartwell court looked to KMLA10 6 and determined that the
critical factor was the intent of the station providing the ser-
vice. 10 In examining the issue of intent, the court noted that
subscription broadcasting has a dual nature, in that while it may
be available to the general public, it is only intended for the use
of paying subscribers. 0 8 Thus, "availability and use are separate
concepts."' 09 Therefore, the Chartwell court found that the cru-
cial factor in determining the intent to broadcast was whether or
not the signal was intended for the use of the general public.1
The court rejected the Orth-O-Vision court's reliance on mass
101. 637 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1980).
102. Subscription television (STV) offers pay television programming by scrambling
the broadcast signal. See supra note 20.
103. Chartwel Com. Group, 637 F.2d at 461.
104. Id. at 462.
105. Id.
106. 264 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1967). See supra text accompanying notes 71-80.
107. Chartwell Corn. Group, 637 F.2d at 463-64. The KMLA court held that it was
the intent of the transmitter not to broadcast its signal that provided protection under §
605. KMLA Broadcast Corp., 264 F. Supp. at 40.
108. Chartwell Com. Group, 637 F.2d at 465.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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availability as determinative of the intent to broadcast."' Thus,
while the Chartwell court noted that content, mass appeal and
mass availability were factors weighing in favor of a finding of
"broadcasting," they could be "negated by clear, objective evi-
dence that the programming is not intended for the use of the
general public."'1  Turning to the question of whether Chartwell
intended its signal for the use of the general public, the court
found that the requirement of special equipment to view the
STV signal provided objective evidence that Chartwell did not
intend to transmit its signal for the use of the general public.113
Finding "an important distinction between making a service
availabile to the general public and intending a program for the
use of the general public,11 4 the Chartwell court held that the
STV signal was protected by section 605 because it did not in-
tend to broadcast its signal for the use of the general public.115
Having found that the STV signal was protected under sec-
tion 605, the Chartwell court turned to the question of whether
defendants' actions of selling decoding equipment violated sec-
tion 605.116 Westbrook argued that they were not assisting in re-
ceiving the signal, as required for a section' 605 violation,1 17 but
rather they were merely helping to clarify signals that had al-
ready been received when they sold equipment to decode the
signal.1 1 8 Finding this argument unpersuasive, the court held
that by selling decoders or decoder schematics, Westbrook was
clearly assisting third parties in receiving unauthorized
communications. 119
111. Id. at 465-66. The court stated in part that while "[m]ass appeal and mass
availability are factors which weigh in favor of finding that a particular activity is broad-
casting .... [Tihose factors may be negated by clear, objective evidence that the pro-
gramming is not intended for the use of the general public." Id. at 465.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 466.
116. Id.
117. Section 605 provides in part: "No person not being entitled thereto shall re-
ceive or assist in receiving any ... communication ... and use such communication ...
for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto." 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1982) (redesignated as § 705(a) in Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-549, § 705(a), 98 Stat. 2779, 2804 (1984)).
118. Chartwell Com. Group, 637 F.2d at 465.
119. Id.
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In delineating the "availability versus use" test the
Chartwell court rejected the Orth-O-Vision court's emphasis on
program content,1 20 and in so doing followed the KMLA court's
emphasis on examining the intent of the transmitter in order to
determine whether a signal was transmitted for use by the gen-
eral public.' 2  Thus, the "availability versus use" test was
whether the transmitter intended the signal for the use of the
general public, not whether the transmitter intended that it be
available to the general public which was the standard estab-
lished by the Orth-O-Vision court.'2 2 Therefore, even though
Chartwell's programs were intended to appeal to a mass audi-
ence, and were available to the general public, they were in-
tended for the use of only those who paid the fee.12' Thus, sec-
tion 605 protected the signal from unauthorized use because the
signal was not broadcast for use by the general public. Although
the Chartwell court determined that not all signals of mass ap-
peal and mass availability were transmitted "for the use of the
general public," and therefore excluded from section 605 protec-
tion, 24 the issue of whether subscription services constituted
broadcasting for the use of the general public was not ultimately
resolved until National Subscription Television v. S & H TV.'2 5
When Chartwell was decided by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, National Subscription Television,1 26 (NST) also an
STV case, was pending appeal in the Ninth Circuit.2 7 In NST,
an STV operator sought an injunction against the makers and
distributors of unauthorized decoders which could be used by
non-subscribers to receive the STV programs.12 8 The appellee
makers and distributors argued that the widespread program-
ming appeal of STV programs and the existing signal delivery
120. See Orth-O- Vision, 474 F. Supp. at 672.
121. See KMLA Broadcasting Corp., 264 F. Supp. at 40.
122. Chartwell Corn. Group, 637 F.2d at 465.
123. See generally id. at 464-65.
124. See supra note 111.
125. 644 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1981).
126. Id.
127. Chartwell Corn, Group was decided on Dec. 29, 1980. See Chartwell Com.
Group, 637 F.2d 459, 459 (6th Cir. 1980). National Subscription Television was argued
and submitted on Jan. 9, 1981. See National Subscription Television, 644 F.2d 820, 820
(9th Cir. 1981).
128. National Subscription Television, 644 F.2d at 821.
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capabilities for the widespread availability of such signals should
determine whether STV signals were transmitted for use by the
general public and thus whether the signals were protected from
unauthorized interception under section 605 of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934.129 S & H TV argued that the programming
appeal of a signal and the signal delivery capabilities of such a
signal had previously been used as a basis for finding that a par-
ticular signal constituted broadcasting. 130 In addition, since the
Communications Act itself defined broadcasting in relevant part
as "radio communications intended to be received by the pub-
lic," once a signal was found to have mass appeal and mass
availability, it was deemed broadcasting.13' Therefore, the signal
was not protected by section 605 since it was "intended to be
received by the public," making it exempt from section 605 pro-
tection.132 In rejecting this argument, the NST court concluded
that only broadcasting intended "for the use of the general pub-
lic" was exempt from section 605 protection.13 3 Finding that
NST intended to deny use of its signal by the general public by
requiring special receiving equipment,' 3 4 the court stated that
NST programming was not broadcast for the use of the general
public, 3 5 and was therefore entitled to section 605 protection.
Having found that the STV signal was not exempt from sec-
tion 605 protection because it was not deemed to be broadcast-
ing for the use of the general public, the NST court then ex-
amined the other arguments raised against signal protection,
such as: the airwaves belong to the public, 13  STV operators
could protect themselves with technology, 37 and that the de-
fendants' business of manufacturing and selling decoders pro-
vided needed competition in the manufacture of decoders. 138
129. Id. at 823.
130. Id. at 821.
131. Id.
132. Id. See supra note 8 where § 605 is set forth in full.
133. Id. at 824 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1982) (redesignated as § 705(a) in Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 705(a), 98 Stat. 2779, 2804
(1984)).
134. Id. at 824.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 826.
137. Id. See also infra note 330 and accompanying text.
138. National Subscription Television, 644 F.2d at 826.
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The NST defendants argued that granting section 605 protec-
tion to the NST signal would be equivalent to granting NST
monopoly control over a particular frequency, 139 and that since
the airwaves belong to the public, monopoly control could not be
granted without congressional approval. 40 In response, the court
noted that, although the airwaves belong to the public, the air-
waves are regulated by Congress and the FCC "in the public in-
terest."' In regulating the airwaves in the public interest, Con-
gress and the FCC grant licenses giving the license holder the
right to prevent others from using their assigned frequency.142
Further, granting section 605 protection to a license holder does
not grant a monopoly because it does not prevent other license
holders from entering and competing in a given broadcast mar-
ket.143 Finally, if an STV operator did not have section 605 pro-
tection to control public viewing of its signal, the operating in-
come from subscriber fees would be reduced, which would
ultimately discourage capital investment in STV operations.' 4
Thus, the public interest would not be served "by the demise of
a product for which there is clearly considerable consumer de-
mand." 14 5 Therefore, protecting the STV signal is consistent
with regulating the publicly owned airwaves in the public
interest.""
Next, the NST defendants argued that Congress intended
that STV operators protect themselves by means of technol-
ogy." I' Rejecting this argument, the court concluded that no au-
thority was offered to support a congressional requirement of
such technological protection. In fact, the court noted that "even
the most technologically sophisticated decoder can be copied by
processes of reverse engineering.""148 Thus, requiring technologi-
cal protection would not necessarily protect the signal from un-
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 825.
145. Id. at 826.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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authorized interception." 9 Finally, the NST court examined the
argument that defendants' actions did no more than provide
needed competition in the manufacture of decoders.' 50 In re-
jecting this argument, the court concluded that defendants' ac-
tivities did not constitute competition because defendants' com-
petitive success would prevent NST from operating as a
commercially viable enterprise, and eventually force NST out of
business;' 5 ' without NST there would be no reason to manufac-
ture decoders in the first place. 152
The NST court then considered the question of whether de-
fendants' actions in manufacturing and selling decoders violated
section 605. The court determined that a section 605 violation
required a showing of: 1) intercepting or assisting in the inter-
ception of protected signals, and 2) divulgence or publication or
aiding in the divulgence or publication of the protected trans-
mission. '3 The court followed Chartwell, holding that the man-
ufacture and sale of decoders clearly assisted third parties in re-
ceiving unauthorized communications in violation of section
605.1" The court stated "[tlhe act of receiving an NST program
on a television set equipped with an unauthorized decoder
amounts to disclosure of the 'existence, contents, substance, pur-
port, effect or meaning of NST's signal to nonsubscribers
[sic]. ' " Therefore, the court found that the sale of the equip-
ment and its use by the purchasers of the equipment to receive
NST's signal constituted assistance in interception and divul-
gence of NST's transmission in violation of section 605. The
NST court therefore followed Chartwell in rejecting the argu-
ment that the mass appeal and the mass availability of a signal
constituted a transmission for the use of the general public.'5 6 In
so doing, the NST court established that a "broadcast" signal
was not automatically excluded from section 605 protection;
only signals broadcast for the use of the general public were un-
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 827.
155. Id.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 131-35.
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protected under section 605.151 In examining whether a signal
was intended for the use of the general public, however, both
Chartwell and NST found that the need for special equipment
to receive the signal negated a finding that the signal was in-
tended for the use of the general public.158 This left open the
question of whether mass availability of the requisite "special
equipment" would exempt a signal from section 605 protec-
tion - an issue raised in Home Box Office, Inc. v. Advanced
Consumer Technology (ACT). 59
In ACT, HBO sought to enjoin ACT's manufacture and na-
tionwide sales of antennas and converters.'6 These antennas
and converters allowed non-subscribers to receive HBO pro-
gramming without paying a subscription fee.'8 ' In opposition,
defendants argued that the HBO signal was not protected by
section 605 because the signal could be received by "technologi-
cally simple"' 6 ' equipment that was readily available to the gen-
eral public.'' s Thus, ACT argued that because HBO had chosen
not to scramble its signal or otherwise make the signal unintel-
ligible without further equipment,'" HBO must be deemed to
have made the signal available for use by the general public, and
therefore HBO's signal was not protected under section 605.
The ACT court examined the legislative history and case
law interpreting section 605's applicability to pay television sig-
nals,' 6 5 and concluded that section 605 was designed to protect
communications which the transmitter intended to protect,'66
even though "unauthorized recipients could readily obtain the
technological capacity to intercept the signal involved.' 6 7 Fur-
157. National Subscription Television, 644 F.2d at 826.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 113 and 134.
159. 549 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
160. A converter is a device to convert a signal from one frequency to another. For
any encrypted television services, a converter generally provides an intelligible signal for
a television set.
161. Advanced Consumer Technology, 549 F. Supp. at 15-16.
162. Id. at 16.
163. Id. at 21.
164. Id. at 16. A scrambled signal will not show a clear video picture without use of
equipment to "decode" the signal.
165. Id. at 17.
166. Id. The court added the proviso that the transmitter had to be authorized by
the FCC to protect the signal (based on a license, etc.). Id.
167. Id. at 17. In ruling that program content does not control § 605 protection, the
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ther, the court found no indication that Congress required the
transmitter to take affirmative steps, such as scrambling, to pro-
tect transmissions from unauthorized interception. 18 In fact, the
court noted that scrambling would be expensive, and that
"scrambling, or any technical protection now available, might
not substantially enhance signal security," 16 9 because "all practi-
cable forms of scrambling are subject to descrambling.' 1 7 The
court held that as long as commercial television sets were inca-
pable of receiving the signal, HBO could reasonably assume that
ordinary, law-abiding citizens would not unilaterally purchase
equipment to intercept the HBO signal.1 71 Therefore, the HBO
signal was entitled to section 605 protection because it was not
made available for use by the general public.172
The ACT court therefore resolved the issue of whether mass
availability of the signal in conjunction with mass availability of
the "special equipment" designed to receive the signal, would
remove the signal from section 605 protection. After ACT, it is
clear that the manufacturers and sellers of equipment designed
to receive a pay television signal without authorization from the
transmitter violate section 605. 17 As a result, pay television sup-
pliers could stop unauthorized manufacturers and sellers from
providing the equipment necessary to receive their signal by
bringing an action under section 605 for injunctive relief.174
However, the pay television suppliers' success in stopping the
manufacture and sale of equipment designed to intercept the
HBO signal led to the argument raised in Ciminelli v.
Cablevision.' 5
court implicitly overruled Orth-O-Vision, 474 F. Supp. 672, although the court at-
tempted to distinguish this case. Advanced Consumer Technology, 549 F. Supp. at 24.
168. Advanced Consumer Technology, 549 F. Supp. at 21.
169. Id. at 22.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 25. The court also stated without discussion that ACT's actions violated
the statute, unless the signal was not protected under § 605. Id. at 16-17.
173. See Cox Cable Cleveland Area, Inc. v. King, 582 F. Supp. 376 (N.D. Ohio 1983)
(sale of devices capable of, and used for, unauthorized interception of cable television
signals violates § 605); American Television & Com. Corp. v. Western Techtronics Inc.,
529 F. Supp. 617 (D. Colo. 1982) (sale of unauthorized MDS equipment plus oral instruc-
tions on use constitutes assistance in unauthorized interception in violation of § 605).
174. Advanced Consumer Technology, 549 F. Supp. at 25.
175. 583 F. Supp. 158 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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In Ciminelli, the seller of equipment designed to receive
cable television signals brought an action against several cable
companies alleging illegal tying17e between cable television ser-
vice and equipment, in violation of the antitrust laws. 177 In op-
position, defendant cable companies (e.g. Cablevision) argued
that their actions of controlling equipment were necessary to
protect their signal from unauthorized interception under sec-
tion 605.178 In ruling on plaintiff Ciminelli's motion to dismiss
the section 605 arguments, the Ciminelli court first rejected the
argument that section 605 does not apply to cable television sig-
nals, citing Chartwell, which applied section 605 protection to
signals not intended for the use of the general public.179 Thus,
having found section 605 protection for the cable signals, the
court refused to dismiss that part of the counterclaim by the
cable companies alleging that any tying arrangements between
cable television operators and cable television reception equip-
ment (i.e. converters, decoders, etc.) were justified by the need
to protect against signal piracy (theft).80 The court stated that
"[w]hile we are not aware of any case, and Cablevision admits
that it has found none, recognizing protection from theft as jus-
tification for an otherwise illegal tying arrangement, we think
the record should be developed before we consider the suffi-
ciency of such a defense."' 8' The Ciminelli court thereby refused
to dismiss the section 605 claim, although the court stressed that
defendant cable companies carried a heavy burden of establish-
ing a justification defense, including the absence of less restric-
tive alternatives to protect their signal.' 8
Thus, in evaluating the rights of pay television companies to
176. "Tying" or a "tie-in arrangement" is an arrangement where the seller will sell
one product (where the seller has monopoly control) only on condition that the buyer
also purchase another product (usually one which is available competitively). Such "ty-
ing" is illegal under § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1982). See generally Interna-
tional Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936). In Ciminelli, the
plaintiff alleged that the cable operators had tied the cable television service (in which
they had a monopoly) to the reception equipment. Ciminelli, 583 F. Supp. at 161.
177. Ciminelli, 583 F. Supp. at 160.
178. Id. at 162.
179. Id. at 161 (the court also cites other pay television cases).
180. Id. at 162.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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protect their signals under section 605, the courts have relied on
Chartwell's "availability versus use" test,18' and have held that
assisting third parties to receive protected communications with-
out the authorization of the transmitter is not justified by any
countervailing social or policy consideration, such as, the possi-
bility of technological protection,184 the promotion of competi-
tion,185 or the use of public airwaves to transmit the protected
signal.18a
b. Civil Cases Against Individual Users
Although the vast majority of section 605 cases have been
brought against the manufacturers and sellers of unauthorized
equipment, there are two reported cases against individual own-
ers of unauthorized equipment who used the equipment to re-
ceive pay television signals without having paid the transmitter.
In Movie Systems, Inc. v. Heller,'87 an MDS operator brought
an action to enjoin an individual who had installed unauthorized
equipment in his home from using the equipment to receive the
MDS signal without paying a fee.188 Defendant Heller argued
that: the MDS transmissions were not protected under section
605 because of their mass appeal and mass availability;18 9 the
alleged electronic surveillance used by the MDS operator to de-
tect the unauthorized interception of the MDS signal violated
his privacy rights;' 90 and the requirement that the receiving
equipment be installed and operated by the MDS operator con-
stituted an illegal tying arrangement in violation of antitrust
laws.' e9
Relying on the decisions in Chartwell and NST, the Eighth
183. The "availablility versus use" test is used to determine whether a signal is pro-
tected by § 605 based on whether the transmitter intends to make the signal available to
the general public, or intends the signal for the use of the general public. The crucial
factor in § 605 is whether the signal was intended for the use of the general public. See
supra text accompanying notes 109-10.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 147-49 and notes 165-71.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 150-52.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 139-46.
187. 710 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1983).
188. Id. at 492-93.
189. Id. at 494.
190. Id. at 496.
191. Id. See also supra note 176 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 6:391
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss3/3
UNAUTHORIZED INTERCEPTION
Circuit rejected Heller's claim that the MDS signal was not pro-
tected under section 605.192 The court held that the crucial ques-
tion in determining whether a signal was protected under section
605 was not the mass appeal or mass availability of the signal,
but rather whether the transmitter intended the signal to be
available for the use of the general public.' 93 Finding that the
MDS signal could not be received on conventional television
sets, but rather required special equipment, the unauthorized in-
terception of the MDS signal was prohibited under section 605
because it was not intended for the use of the general public.""
In examining Heller's affirmative defenses, the court first
examined the argument that the alleged use of electronic equip-
ment to detect the unauthorized reception of MDS signals, con-
stituted an invasion of privacy. 95 In rejecting this argument, the
court noted that there was no showing of the requisite "state
action" necessary to bring the action within the purview of the
fourth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution, and that
the state (Minnesota) had never recognized a cause of action for
invasion of privacy. 96 Therefore, Heller did not have an invasion
of privacy claim against the MDS operators.
Next, the court addressed Heller's claim that Movie Sys-
tems, Inc.'s requirement that it install, maintain and control the
MDS receiving equipment constituted an illegal tying arrange-
ment under antitrust laws. The court rejected this argument,
stating that the tying resulted from an FCC mandate that the
receiving equipment be under the control of the MDS opera-
tor. "'97 Therefore, because it was not the MDS operator, but
rather the FCC that required a "tie" between the service and
the equipment, the antitrust claim against the MDS operator
had no merit.' 98
The Heller court therefore found a section 605 violation in
192. Heller, 710 F.2d at 494.
193. Id. See KMLA Broadcasting Corp. v. Twentieth Century Cigarette Vendors
Corp., 264 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1967); see also supra notes 109-10 and accompanying
text (discussing this aspect of the Chartwell decision).
194. Heller, 710 F.2d at 495.
195. Id. at 496.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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defendant's installation and use of equipment to receive the pro-
tected MDS signal in his home without authorization from the
transmitter. 99
Similarly, in Hoosier Home Theater, Inc. v. Adkins'00 the
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana found a sec-
tion 605 violation where an individual assembled unauthorized
receiving equipment from standard electronic parts and used the
equipment to receive the pay television signal in his home with-
out paying the transmitter.2 0 1
In Hoosier, the defendant did not argue that his use of the
MDS signal was authorized, but rather that his unauthorized use
did not constitute a section 605 violation because the signal was
available at his home without any active solicitation on his part;
thus, the signal should be deemed a "gift. '2 02 Further, he argued
that his actions in installing and using the equipment in his own
home did not violate section 605 because while his interception
of the signal was unauthorized, he had not divulged the contents
of the signal as required for a section 605 violation.20 3
In rejecting the defendant's arguments, the court held that
the fact that Adkins had to install equipment to receive the sig-
nal negated his claim that the signal was a "gift. '204 Further,
rejecting Adkins' claim that without divulgement there was no
section 605 violation, the court held that the "unauthorized re-
ceipt and use of the signal for [defendant's] own benefit" was
enough to constitute a section 605 violation, and therefore no
divulgence was necessary.0 5
In both Heller and Hoosier, the courts were willing to apply
section 605 against individual users of equipment on the same
basis as section 605 was applied against manufacturers and sell-
ers. Both the Heller and Hoosier courts followed the reasoning
of earlier pay television cases against manufacturers/sellers,
199. Id.
200. 595 F. Supp. 389 (S.D. Ind. 1984).
201. Id. at 393.
202. Id. at 394.
203. Id. at 394-95.
204. Id. at 396. While the court rejected Adkins' argument that the signal should be
deemed a gift, the court later notes that, based on the ease with which the signal was
acquired, anyone might reach the conclusion that the action was harmless, or that any
law to the contrary would be unenforceable. Id. at 398-99.
205. Id.
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holding that the unauthorized interception and use of a pay tele-
vision signal violated section 605.
c. Criminal Cases
Since section 605 of the Communications Act is a criminal
statute, 20 6 an obvious question is whether the unauthorized in-
terception and use of a signal also constitutes a criminal viola-
tion. In the two criminal cases applying section 605 - United
States v. Westbrook 20 7 and United States v. Stone2 08  _ the un-
authorized interception and use of a signal was held to be suffi-
cient for a finding of criminal liability.
United States v. Westbrook was a criminal proceeding
which charged the Chartwell defendants, manufacturers and
sellers of unauthorized STV equipment, with violations of sec-
tion 605.209 In Westbrook, the court looked at the defendants'
actions of selling the electronic decoding equipment, used by
non-subscribers for unauthorized reception of Chartwell's STV
programs, to determine if the charge of a section 605 violation
could withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to charge an of-
fense.210 In bringing the motion to dismiss, the defendants ar-
gued that because the signal constituted broadcasting, it was not
subject to section 605 protection,2 ' and that they also lacked
the sufficient mens rea for the crime charged.2 12 The court stated
that while STV transmissions can be received by the general
public, the transmissions cannot be used by the public without
special equipment, and that, the STV operators' ability to send
selectively received signals brings the STV signal within section
605 protection. 1 3 Thus, criminal sanctions are appropriate.1 4
In evaluating defendants' argument, that, even though their
actions in selling such unauthorized equipment might amount to
interference with business relations, they should not be subject
206. Advanced Consumer Technology, 549 F. Supp. at 18.
207. 502 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
208. 546 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
209. United States v. Westbrook, 502 F. Supp. at 589.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 590.
213. Id. at 591.
214. Id. at 592.
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to criminal liability,213 the court held that the language of sec-
tion 605 should be applied equally in civil and criminal cases.21
However, since this case represented the first criminal prosecu-
tion for the unauthorized manufacture and sale of decoders,217
the court concluded that it needed to further examine the de-
gree of mens rea necessary to establish criminal liability and
therefore, the court denied the motion to dismiss.2 8
In holding that the language of section 605 should be ap-
plied equally to both civil and criminal cases, the Westbrook
court laid the groundwork for United States v. Stone.21 9 In
Stone, the defendants were charged with selling unauthorized
MDS equipment which was used to receive pay television sig-
nals.220 Defendants argued that receiving an omnidirectional 22'
transmission did not constitute interception, and that the al-
leged divulgence was a form of free speech protected by the first
amendment.2 22
The Stone court summarily rejected defendants' argument,
holding that there was ample support in case law and the legisla-
tive history of section 605 to find a section 605 violation in the
interception and disclosure of MDS transmissions.223
Secondly, in examining the defendants' free speech argu-
ment, the court noted that the MDS communications did not
originate with the defendants, but rather were private communi-
cations among parties other than defendants.2 24 As such, defend-
ants had intercepted otherwise private communications without
authorization.223 Further, the court held that the interception
and divulgence constituted non-communicative conduct, not
speech.226 Therefore, defendants' actions in intercepting and di-
215. Id. at 593.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 592.
218. Id. at 593.
219. 546 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
220. Id. at 236.
221. Omnidirectional means radiating out in all directions from a single transmis-
sion site.
2 2. Stone, 546 F. Supp. at 236.
223. Id. at 240.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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vulging private MDS communications by selling unauthorized
equipment to intercept the MDS signal, were not shielded by
the first amendment.227 Thus, the defendants' motion to dismiss
the indictment was denied.2 8
From 1979 through 1984, courts, with the single exception
of the Orth-O-Vision court,2 9 found that pay television signals
were protected from unauthorized interception and use. In addi-
tion, manufacturers, sellers230 and individual home users 3 ' were
found liable for unauthorized interception.2 32  Furthermore,
courts have held that section 605 applies similarly to both crimi-
nal and civil cases. 233 Thus, in both civil and criminal cases, sig-
nals not intended for the use of the general public were pro-
tected from unauthorized interception under section 605 of the
Communications Act of 1934.
C. Section 605 Becomes Section 705(a) - The 1984
Amendments
1. The "New" Law
On October 30, 1984, Congress passed The Cable Communi-
cations Policy Act of 1984.234 The Cable Act, which established
national policies on cable television operations and communica-
tions,235 incorporated the first major revision to section 605 in
fifty years.2 3 In revising section 605, the Cable Act redesignated
and expanded section 605 into section 705 (section 605 became
section 705(a)).2 37 The new Cable Act was promulgated to ad-
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Ortho-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text. But see supra note 167 and accompany-
ing text.
230. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 187-205 and accompanying text.
232. See supra text following note 205.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 215-16.
234. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984).
235. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 601, 98
Stat. 2779, 2780 (1984).
236. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
237. See Lloyd, New Cable Law Takes Aim Against Pirates, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 29,
1984, at 5, col. 1. See also 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1982) (redesignated as § 705(a) in Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 705(a), 98 Stat. 2779, 2804
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dress such issues as, "the growing practice of individuals taking
down satellite programming for private, home viewing by means
of privately owned backyard earth stations, as well as the in-
creasing need to adopt stronger penalties and remedies for the
unauthorized interception of signals prohibited under section
605."1238
a. Private Home Satellite Viewing
The new section 705 specifically excludes from protection
the unauthorized interception of satellite cable programming for
private viewing, as long as the programming is neither encrypted
nor has a marketing system whereby an individual can obtain
authorization to intercept the programming 3 9 Further, the new
(1984)).
238. 130 CONG. REC. S14286-87 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984).
239. The new sections provide in pertinent part:
§ 705(b). The provisions of subsection (a) shall not apply to the interception
or receipt by any individual, or the assisting (including the manufacture or sale) of
such interception or receipt, of any satellite cable programming for private view-
ing if -
(1) the programming involved is not encrypted; and
(2) (A) a marketing system is not established under which - (i) an agent or
agents have been lawfully designated for the purpose of authorizing private view-
ing by individuals, and (ii) such authorization is available to the individual in-
volved from the appropriate agent or agents; or (B) a marketing system described
in subparagraph (A) is established and the individuals receiving such program-
ming have obtained authorization for private viewing under that system.
(c) For the purposes of this section -
(1) the term "satellite cable programming" means video programming which is
transmitted via satellite and which is primarily intended for the direct receipt by
cable operators for their retransmission to cable subscribers;
(2) the term "agent," with respect to any person, includes an employee of such
person;
(3) the term "encrypt," when used with respect to satellite cable programming,
means to transmit such programming in a form whereby the aural and visual char-
acteristics (or both) are modified or altered for the purpose of preventing the un-
authorized receipt of such programming by persons without authorized equipment
which is designed to eliminate the effects of such modification or alteration;
(4) the term "private viewing" means the viewing for private use in an individual's
dwelling unit by means of equipment, owned or operated by such individual, capa-
ble of receiving satellite cable programming directly from a satellite; and
(5) the term "private financial gain" shall not include the gain resulting to any
individual for the private use in such individual's dwelling unit of any program-
ming for which the individual has not obtained authorization for that use.
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 705(b)-(c), 98 Stat.
2779, 2802 (1984).
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section 705 provides immunity to individuals, such as equipment
manufacturers and sellers, who assist in the unauthorized inter-
ception of unprotected cable satellite programming. 40 However,
while limiting statutory protection over private home viewing of
cable satellite programming, the amendments assist anti-piracy
efforts by clearly providing legal protection to protected trans-
missions in civil suits.241
240. See Lloyd, New Cable Law Takes Aim Against Pirates, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 29,
1984, at 5, col. 2.
241. The new section provides in pertinent part:
§ 705(d)(1). Any person who willfully violates subsection (a) shall be fined not
more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than 6 months, or both.
(2) Any person who violates subsection (a) willfully and for purposes of direct
or indirect commercial advantage or private financial gain shall be fined not more
than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than 1 year, or both, for the first such
conviction and shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned for not more
than 2 years, or both, for any subsequent conviction.
(3)(A) Any person aggrieved by any violation of subsection (a) may bring a
civil action in a United States district court or in any other court of competent
jurisdiction.
(B) The court may -
(i) grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem rea-
sonable to prevent or restrain violations of subsection (a);
(ii) award damages as described in subparagraph (C); and
(iii) direct the recovery of full costs, including awarding reasonable attorneys'
fees to an aggrieved party who prevails.
(C) (i) Damages awarded by any court under this section shall be computed, at
the election of the aggrieved party, in accordance with either of the following
subclauses;
(I) The party aggrieved may recover the actual damages suffered by him as a
result of the violation and any profits of the violator that are attributable to the
violation which are not taken into account in computing the actual damages; in
determining the violator's profits, the party aggrieved shall be required to prove
only the violator's gross revenue, and the violator shall be required to prove his
deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than
the violation; or
(II) the party aggrieved may recover an award of statutory damages for each
violation involved in the action in a sum of not less than $250 or more than
$10,000, as the court considers just.
(ii) In any case which the court finds that the violation was committed willfully
and for the purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or private finan-
cial gain, the court in its discretion may increase the award of damages, whether
actual or statutory, by an amount of not more than $50,000.
(iii) In any case where the court finds that the violator was not aware and had no
reason to believe that his acts constituted a violation of this section, the court in
its discretion may reduce the award of damages to a sum of not less than $100.
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 705(d)(1)-(3), 98 Stat.
2779, 2802 (1984).
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b. Expansion of Civil Anti-Piracy Weapons
The former section 605 did not specifically provide for a pri-
vate cause of action against the unauthorized interception of
protected signals, although this right was found in early section
605 cases.' The new section 705 provides that any aggrieved
person may bring a civil action in any district court.2 3 There-
fore, although the exact definition of an "aggrieved person" is
unclear from the legislative history,4 this section codifies the
242. Although subject to repeated questioning in the early cases, a private right of
action under § 605 was first recognized in 1947 in the landmark case of Reitmeister v.
Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947). See also Spraul, Decoding Section 605 of the
Federal Communications Act: A Cause of Action for Unauthorized Reception of Sub-
scription Television, 50 CIN. L. REv. 362, 367 (1981). By 1984, the private right of action
was so well recognized that at least one court merely stated that it existed. Hoosier
Home Theater, Inc. v. Adkins, 595 F. Supp. 389, 395 (S.D. Ind. 1984). The earlier dis-
putes on the existence of a private right of action have now been largely eliminated by §
705(d)(3)(A) which explicitly provides a private cause of action. Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 705(d)(3)(A), 98 Stat. 2779, 2803 (1984). See
supra note 241. See also Lloyd, New Cable Law Takes Aim Against Pirates, N.Y.L.J.,
Dec. 29, 1984, at 5, col. 1. While this provision explicitly establishes a private right of
action, this may still be subject to argument with regard to whether a party is truly
"aggrieved." See, e.g., Air Capital Communications, Inc. v. Starlink Communications
Group, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1568 (D. Kan. 1985) (two cable television operators have no
standing, under the new Act, to bring § 605 claim against satellite dish equipment manu-
facturers/sellers who do not receive signals from the cable companies' transmissions).
Although a claim of no private cause of action based on standing may therefore still be
made, evaluation of this claim is beyond the scope of this Comment.
243. See § 705(d)(3)(A), supra note 241.
244. Compare the legislative history, as printed in the Congressional Record for the
House, which says in part:
Under subsection [d](3)(A), the term 'any person aggrieved' shall be broadly in-
terpreted by the courts in such cases and shall include those with any rights in the
intercepted radio communications. Such persons would include but are not limited
to, owners of the programming being transmitted as well as senders of the signal
embodying the programming transmitted.
130 CONG. REc. H12238 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (explanation of § 705 as redesignated
and amended by the House of Representatives); with the remarks of Sen. Goldwater
discussing
the terms 'Any person aggrieved,' 'aggrieved party,' and 'party aggrieved' in
705(d)(3), relative to civil actions. These terms may be broadly construed to in-
clude all those who own the rights in the programming being transmitted, as well
as those who own the rights for satellite transmission. But it does not include
those entities which possess limited rights of reception and retransmission to the
programming . . ..
130 CONG. REC. S14284 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Goldwater). See also
Lo Frisco, Television Piracy, 199 PRAc. L. INST. 87 (1985).
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case law creating an implied private right of action2 45 and should
prevent any narrowing of private rights of action under the
Communications Act.24
6
In addition, section 705 continues the prohibition against
unauthorized interception of protected signals for both private
and commercial purposes, 47 thereby broadening the prohibi-
tions against commercial ventures that import, manufacture, sell
or distribute equipment intended to be used for the unautho-
rized interception of signals.2 48
Finally, the new section 705 provides for specific statutory
remedies, including: (1) granting temporary and permanent in-
junctive relief;249 (2) damage awards, where the plaintiff may
elect either actual or statutory damages;2 50 (3) increasing dam-
ages awards where the section 705(a) (formerly section 605) vio-
lation is undertaken for commercial advantage or private finan-
cial gain;251 (4) reducing damages to $100 where the pirate had
no reason to believe his actions violated section 705;252 (5)
awarding recovery of full costs including reasonable attorney's
fees2 5 Because section 605 did not provide for any private right
of action, section 605 remedies were based on an amalgam of
remedies borrowed from other statutes such as the Copyright
Act.2 Section 705 eliminates this need by providing specific
245. See generally Lo Frisco, supra note 244.
246. Id. at 94.
247. Id. at 103.
248. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, §
705(d)(3)(C)(ii), 98 Stat. 2779, 2803 (1984) (set forth in full supra note 241).
249. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, §
705(d)(3)(B)(i), 98 Stat. 2779, 2803 (1984) (set forth in full supra note 241). See also Lo
Frisco, supra note 244, at 98-99.
250. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 705
(d)(3)(C), 98 Stat. 2779, 2803 (1984) (set forth in full supra note 241). See also, Lo
Frisco, supra note 244, at 98-99.
251. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, §
705(d)(3)(C)(ii), 98 Stat. 2779, 2803 (1984) (set forth in full supra note 241). See also Lo
Frisco, supra note 244, at 101.
252. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, §
705(d)(3)(C)(iii), 98 Stat. 2779, 2803 (1984) (set forth in full supra note 241). See also Lo
Frisco, supra note 244, at 100.
253. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, §
705(d)(3)(B)(ii), (iii), 98 Stat. 2779, 2803 (1984) (set forth in full supra note 241). See
also Lo Frisco, supra note 244, at 98.
254. See Lo Frisco, supra note 244, at 97-98. See also Lloyd, New Cable Law Takes
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remedies for the unauthorized interception of signals.255
Therefore, although the 1984 amendments were designed
primarily to codify existing case law,256 the changes have done
far more than just codify existing law. The Cable Act provided
new piracy provisions and a new, and sometimes conflicting, leg-
islative history257 for the courts to apply.258
2. Cases Interpreting Section 705
Since the amendments to section 605 became effective on
December 29, 1984, only two federal courts have decided cases
based on section 705(a) claims; one of these cases involved the
seller of equipment, and the other case involved the individual
user of unauthorized equipment.
In Air Capital Cablevision, Inc. v. Starlink Communica-
tions Group, 259 a Kansas district court considered the first re-
ported case of a section 6056 claim against an earth station dis-
Aim Against Pirates, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 29, 1984, at 5, col. 1.
255. See supra notes 248-53 and accompanying text.
256. The legislative history of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, as
printed in the Congressional Record', says in part:
H.R. 4103 as reported by Committee recodifies without modification § 605 to the
Communications Act of 1934 as new § 705(a). In amending existing § 605, it is
intended to leave undisturbed the case law that has developed confirming the
broad reach of section 605 as a deterrent against piracy of protected communica-
tions. Over the years federal courts, consistent with congressional intent, have rec-
ognized that § 605 provided broad protection against the unauthorized intercep-
tion of various forms of radio communications. It is the Committee's intention
that the amendment preserve these broad protections: that all acts which pres-
ently constitute a violation of present § 605 shall continue to be unlawful under
that section as amended and redesignated by H.R. 4103.... For example, existing
§ 605 provides protection against the unauthorized reception of subscription tel-
evision (STV), multipoint distribution service (MDS), and satellite communica-
tions. This amendment ... is intended to preserve this broad reach of existing §
605 and to make clear that all communications covered under § 605, will con-
tinue to be protected under new § 705(a).
130 CONG. REC. S14287 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (legislative history of The Cable Tele-
communication Act) (emphasis added). See also Lloyd, New Cable Law Takes Aim
Against Pirates, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 29, 1984, at 5, col. 1.
257. See supra notes 50 and 244.
258. The new provisions in § 705(b)-(e) took effect on December 29, 1984. See
Lloyd, New Cable Law Takes Aim Against Pirates, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 29, 1984, at 5, col. 1.
259. 601 F. Supp. 1568 (D. Kan. 1985).
260. Id. at 1571.
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tributor. 6' In Air Capital two cable television operators sued an
earth station distributor, claiming that the sale of earth stations
violated section 605 by assisting in the unauthorized reception of
satellite transmissions. 62 The Air Capital opinion, dated Febru-
ary 1985, considered three issues: 1) whether the amendments to
section 605 removed the distributor's actions in selling earth sta-
tions from section 705 protection; 63 2) whether the distributor
should be required to advise potential customers on authorized
uses for earth stations;264 and 3) whether the distributor had
valid antitrust claims against the cable operators.6 5
In evaluating whether the 1984 amendments allowed the
sale of earth stations, the court stated that: "ft]he legislative his-
tory of the [Cable Act] makes [it] clear that in the absence of
encrypted programming or an established marketing system, the
manufacture, sale or distribution of earth station satellite dishes
does not violate the Act. '12 6 Therefore, defendants' actions in
selling earth station satellite dishes did not in itself constitute a
violation of section 705 because the earth stations were sold for
the private viewing of unprotected signals.267
In evaluating plaintiff cable television operators' motion to
amend their complaint to require defendant to notify its cus-
tomers on the authorized and unauthorized uses of earth sta-
tions, 66 the court noted that "the statute imposes no duty upon
[earth station sellers] to advise its customers about authorized
or unauthorized use of the equipment '"69 and that "the seller is
not liable for the customers' violations of section 705 unless...
the seller willfully assists in the violation. 2 7 0 Therefore, the
court denied plaintiff's motion.
Finally, the court addressed the earth station distributor's
counterclaim that the cable operators were attempting to mo-
261. An earth station distributor is someone who sells earth stations. See supra note
22 for definition of "earth station."
262. Air Capital Cablevision, Inc., 601 F. Supp. at 1569.
263. Id. at 1569-71.
264. Id. at 1572.
265. Id. at 1572-73.
266. Id. at 1570.
267. Id. at 1570-72.
268. Id. at 1572.
269. Id.
270. Id.
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nopolize the means of home reception of satellite television pro-
gramming distribution to consumers,11 by instituting the Air
Capital suit against the earth station seller, and threatening
lawsuits against the seller's customers.17 In examining the mo-
nopolization claim,27 3 the court noted that the claim consisted of
two elements: 1) the possession of monopoly power in the rele-
vant market, and 2) overt acts constituting the purposeful acqui-
sition or maintenance of monopoly power.274 Starlink argued
that the relevant product market was that of providing facilities
for home viewing of satellite cable programming,2 7 and that Air
Capital was attempting to monopolize that market through
baseless litigation.2 76 The court held that 'Starlink had alleged a
relevant product market sufficient to survive Air Capital's mo-
tion to dismiss, leaving only the antitrust counterclaim to be de-
cided through litigation.2 77
Air Captial was the first case to examine the applicability of
section 705(a) to satellite transmissions; and it differs from prior
section 605 cases in that the parties seeking to protect the trans-
mission, cable operators, were not the originators of the trans-
mission, z7  but rather they were authorized receivers of the
transmission.2 7 As such, while the case is interesting in setting
the stage for further development in the area of satellite trans-
missions, it does not alter the rationale of the section 605 cases
which gave a pay television supplier section 605 protection
against those who received their transmission without
authorization. 80
271. Id. at 1573.
272. Id.
273. To determine whether there is monopolization, a court must first delineate a
relevant market in order to determine whether the alleged monopolist controls the price
and competition in the market for such part as they are charged with monopolizing.
United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 388 (1956).
274. Air Capital Cablevision, Inc., 601 F. Supp. at 1572 (citing United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)).
275. Id. at 1573.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1571.
279. Id.
280. In general, pay television suppliers sell directly to subscribers, either transmit-
ting the signal directly, such as in Pay TV, Orth-O-Vision, and Advanced Consumer
Technology; or in retransmitting a signal, such as in Ciminelli.
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In California Satellite Systems v. Seimon281 an MDS opera-
tor sought an injunction against an individual who installed mi-
crowave equipment to intercept the MDS signal without author-
ization from the MDS operator.218  In opposition, defendant
Seimon argued that he had not violated section 705 because he
had a first amendment right of access to public radio signals and
that the equipment could be used to receive public radio sig-
nals.2" Acknowledging the potential validity of such a claim,
where both protected and unprotected signals could be received
on the same equipment, the court, nevertheless, found the argu-
ment unpersuasive because the defendant used the equipment
exclusively for the unauthorized interception of the MDS sig-
nal.284 Thus, the court rejected defendant's first amendment
argument. 285
Neither Air Capital nor Seimon represent dramatic depar-
tures from the reasoning of the pre-section 705 cases.2 86 Al-
though the Air Capital court held that certain cable satellite
programming was unprotected against private home use,2 87 this
issue had not been previously addressed in the section 605
cases. 288 Further, there is evidence in the legislative history of
the new section 705 that allowing private home use of certain
cable satellite programming was one of the major reasons behind
the 1984 amendments. 28 9 Even so, the Seimon court, evaluating
a case substantially similar to earlier section 605 cases, had no
difficulty in finding protection for the MDS signal.2 90 These two
cases, therefore, are indicative of the reasoned decisions antici-
pated by section 705.291
281. 767 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1985).
282. Id. at 1365. MDS transmits pay television programming via microwave from a
centrally located transmitter. See supra note 21.
283. California Satellite Sys., 767 F.2d at 1365. Seimon claimed that the equipment
could also be used for non-infringing purposes - such as receipt of nonsubscription
educational programming - and that he has a first amendment right to listen to the
non-infringing communication. Id.
284. Id. at 1368.
285. Id.
286. See supra notes 229-33 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 266-67 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 281-85.
291. See supra note 50.
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Conversely, at least one state court has found a dramatic
policy shift in the 1984 amendments. In The People v. Baby-
lon,292 the Supreme Court of California held that unencoded
MDS transmissions were outside the scope of California's state
law against signal piracy, 293 reversing their earlier position that
unencoded MDS transmissions were protected under section
605. 394
In Babylon the defendant sold an investigator an "HBO
system. '295 He told her that there was no law against her owning
or using the system, but that if she told him she was going to use
it for HBO, he would not sell it to her.2 96 When the investigator
asked what other programs the system would receive, defendant
Babylon told her that only HBO could be received in her area.297
Despite this, the California court concluded that California state
law did not prohibit the sale of equipment which was "designed
merely to receive in intelligible form unencoded microwave
transmissions broadcast by a multipoint distribution service"
(MDS) 2" even though such equipment would be used to inter-
cept unauthorized signals. In examining state law in light of fed-
eral law, the court noted that
[S]ection 705 offers considerably less protection to transmissions
which are unencoded than to encoded, scrambled, or addressed
signals. It rewards those operators who invest substantial effort
and money in an attempt to protect their signals, leaving other
operators with the choice of establishing a satisfactory authoriza-
tion program or risk economic loss due to "video piracy."'2 9 '
292. 39 Cal. 3d 70, 702 P.2d 205, 216 Cal. Rptr. 123, reprinted as modified 39 Cal.
3d 719 (1985) (although the modified decision removes the reference to new § 705, the
remainder of the opinion is unchanged).
293. The original opinion evaluated the new § 705 amendments as part of the rea-
soning for their holding. 39 Cal. 3d 70, -, 702 P.2d 205, 210, 216 Cal. Rptr. 123, -,
reprinted as modified 39 Cal. 3d 719 (the modified decision removed the reference to §
705 leaving the remainder of the reasoning and opinion unchanged).
294. 39 Cal. 3d 70, -, 702 P.2d 205, 210, 216 Cal. Rptr. 123, -.
295. 39 Cal. 3d 70, -, 702 P.2d 205, 207-08, 216 Cal. Rptr. 123, -. (The "HBO
system" consisted of the equipment necessary to receive the MDS signal, including mi-
crowave antenna and converter).
296. 39 Cal. 3d 70, -, 702 P.2d 205, 208, 216 Cal. Rptr. 123, -.
297. Id.
298. 39 Cal. 3d 70, -, 702 P.2d 205, 210, 216 Cal. Rptr. 123, -.
299. 39 Cal. 3d 70, -, 702 P.2d 205, 211, 216 Cal. Rptr. 123, -.
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The court refrained from deciding whether the HBO
franchise agreement (an exclusive area franchise from HBO to
the MDS operator) satisfied the requirements of an "authoriza-
tion program," which would have protected the programming
signal under section 705.300
Although the Babylon court modified its original opinion to
eliminate the section 705 references, the court did not alter the
outcome or rationale of the case. This rationale, if followed by
federal courts, would require that all transmitters use at least
some minimal level of technological protection in order to fall
under the purview of section 705 protection. 0' Such a construc-
tion would represent a radical departure from existing case law
developments in the area of signal protection. 02
III. Analysis
In determining the applicability of section 605 (now section
705(a)), the federal courts established a working methodology to
determine whether a signal was protected from unauthorized in-
terception under section 605 based on a three part "test": 1) Can
the transmitter show by clear objective evidence that his signals
are not intended for the use of the general public?303 2) Are the
"pirates'" activities sufficient to bring them within the scope of
proscribed activity?304 3) Does the alleged "pirate" have a valid
defense that would remove the activities from proscribed
conduct?30 5
300. Id. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, §
705(b)(2), 98 Stat. 2779, 2802 (1984) (set forth in full supra note 239).
301. The Babylon court stated that the Cable Act "which radically reshaped federal
law in this area... clearly distinguishes between encoded and unencoded transmissions,
affording a lesser degree of protection to the latter." Babylon, 39 Cal. 3d 70, -, 702 P.2d
205, 211, 216 Cal. Rptr. 123, -.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 229-33 and 286-90.
303. This part of the "test" began in Chartwell Corn. Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d
459 (6th Cir. 1980) and has continued to be applied by the courts. See supra text accom-
panying note 112-115.
304. Compare United States v. Westbrook, 502 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (re-
ceipt and use constitute violation) with Air Capital Cablevision, Inc. v. Starlink Corn.
Group, 601 F. Supp. 1568 (D. Kan. 1985) (manufacture, sale or distribution of earth
stations to home users alone does not constitute a violation).
305. See California Satellite Sys., 767 F.2d at 1368 (first amendment argument
might have validity in the abstract but not when applied to the facts of the particular
case). See supra text accompanying notes 281-85.
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The 1984 amendments, however, changed section 605 by
giving the added protection of harsher penalties to protected sig-
nals,30 6 while removing certain cable satellite programming sig-
nals from section 705(a) (formerly section 605) protection.307 To
determine what effect the amendments should have on the
methodology or results of prior section 605 cases, it is important
to analyze why the law was amended, the current status of com-
munications' protection, and the proscribed activities under the
law.
A. Why Amend?
1. The Real World
By year end 1984, an estimated one million people in the
United States owned, and presumably used, earth stations to re-
ceive satellite transmissions."0 Although the law did not pro-
hibit private ownership or installation of earth stations, the
question of whether an earth station owner's unauthorized inter-
ception of satellite transmissions might violate section 605 was
unclear.309 While it was clear that earth stations could be used to
receive dozens of legally unprotected signals, 310 it was equally
clear that a large number of earth station owners enjoyed pay
television programming which the transmitter did not intend for
their use.3 ' Also, some commentators on section 605 expressed
concern that harsh penalties for the unauthorized interception
306. See supra text accompanying notes 242-55.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 239-40.
308. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. See also 130 CoNG. REC. S14283
(daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Goldwater) (the legislative history of the
Cable Act states that in the five or six years home satellite technology has been available,
"nearly one million home satellite antennas have been sold.")
309. The Air Capital court, evaluating whether the defendants' activities in selling
earth stations violated § 605 as amended, stated in relevant part: "Numerous courts had
held that § 605 prohibited the manufacture, sale and distribution of equipment that
enabled home users to intercept or decode programming transmitted or retransmitted by
subscription television companies or by cable television companies." Air Capital
Cablevision, Inc., 767 F.2d at 1569. Further "[iut is crystal clear to this court that the
1984 amendments to the Communications Act of 1934 were enacted specifically to pro-
tect enterprises such as [the sale of earth stations for private home use]. Id. at 1570. See
also, Lo Frisco, supra note 245, at 105-06.
310. See Bienstock, supra note 18, at 245 n.40.
311. Warshaw, The Latest Dish, PHILADELPHIA, Oct. 1985, at 105, 107.
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of satellite programming would create a problem for private
earth station owners unless: 1) they could readily determine
which satellite transmissions were protected from such unautho-
rized interception (perhaps through scrambling of protected
transmissions);312 and unless 2) there was a means established
whereby earth station owners could pay for the protected trans-
missions which they wanted to receive. 13 Further, the legislative
history of section 705 makes it clear that Congress was con-
cerned about the effect of any changes on private earth station
owners." 4 Thus, Congress exempted the private use of unen-
crypted satellite cable programming from section 605 protection,
provided no marketing system was established for such pro-
gramming. 5 In this way, Congress addressed the concerns of
earth station buyers and sellers, 316 while nevertheless ensuring
the continued protection of pay television signals in general.317
2. Damages as a Deterrent
All the section 605 and section 705 cases seek injunctive re-
lief to stop the unauthorized interception of protected signals.
The reasons for this are clear. By allowing people to receive pro-
gramming for which they do not pay, signal piracy affects the
viability of the pay, television distribution system in that it
reduces potential revenues. 18 At the same time, monetary dam-
ages for signal piracy are often difficult to ascertain (e.g. in the
case of equipment sellers, the damage calculation would be
based on the number of units sold, the length of time they were
in use, etc.).31 9 Thus, in this environment, there is an incentive
for pirates to enter the market to sell unauthorized equipment
312. Westover, supra note 14, at 22 n.112.
313. Id.
314. See supra text accompanying note 238.
315. See § 705(b)(2) supra note 239.
316. See supra text accompanying note 238.
317. See supra note 50.
318. Note, supra note 19, at 641-42.
319. Home Box Office, Inc. v. Advanced Consumer Technology, 549 F. Supp. 14, 25
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (defendants exploitative business operation threatens the viability of
MDS transmissions); American Television & Com. Corp. v. Western Techtronics, Inc.,
529 F. Supp. 617, 621 (D. Colo. 1982) ("Defendants conduct is prohibited by § 605, and it
is no defense that some of them have chosen as a vocation a business that has turned out
to be unlawful.").
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until they are ordered to stop. In this way, the "pirate" attains
short-term profits while the pay television supplier sustains
long-term harm.3 20 By providing harsher remedies321 the new law
aims at deterring signal piracy through a reduction or elimina-
tion of the pirate's short-term profits.
3. The Role of the States
The amendments specifically provide that section 705 does
not preempt any state or local laws pertaining to signal piracy
(otherwise known as theft of service).322 Since virtually all states
have theft-of-service laws, 23 the new federal law provides a fo-
rum for signal protection cases324 while allowing individual
states to develop laws specifically targeted to piracy problems.32 5
B. What is Protected?
Section 705 protects all signals not broadcast for the use of
the general public, except for cable satellite programming sig-
nals which are neither encrypted nor have a marketing authori-
zation program established to allow private home authoriza-
tions.32 6 However, the courts' emphasis on the need for special
equipment to receive protected signals indicates that they are
not prepared to enforce any law which protects a signal that has
become readily accessible. 27 Both Congress, in enacting the 1984
amendment, and the courts, have indicated to the pay television
320. The "pirate" could sell decoding equipment to receive a pay television sup-
plier's signal without payment of the fee until such time as a court enjoined further sale.
At that point, the "pirate" was barred from any further profits. However, the purchasers
of the "pirate" equipment could continue to use the equipment on the system unless a
further injunction against the individual was obtained.
321. Lloyd, New Cable Law Takes Aim Against Pirates, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 29, 1984, at
5, col. 3. See also supra notes 242-58.
322. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 705 (d)(6), 98
Stat. 2779, 2803 (1984). See also Lloyd, New Cable Law Takes Aim Against Pirates,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 29, 1984, at 5, col. 3.
323. See NEW YORK STATE CABLE TELEVISION ASSOCIATION, CABLE THEFT MANUAL
(1983).
324. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, §
705(d)(3)(A), 98 Stat. 2779, 2802 (1984); supra note 241.
325. See supra note 322.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 240-41.
327. See supra text accompanying note 158.
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distributors that some technological protection of transmissions
may be required for continued section 705 protection.32 8 Thus,
the courts may well be asked to decide what level of technology
is required to protect a signal, 2 9 and whether subscription
broadcasters will be periodically required to upgrade their tech-
nological protection."3 '
C. . What is the Proscribed Activity?
1. In General
Prior to the 1984 amendments, the courts held that receipt
of the transmission plus the use of the transmission constituted
a violation of section 605.331 In fact, a section 605 violation had
even been found in Hoosier Home Theatre, Inc. v. Adkins, 332
where a private individual assembled, installed and used micro-
wave equipment within his own home to receive MDS transmis-
sions. 3 As of 1984, however, section 705(b) now creates an ex-
ception for the home use of cable satellite programming, and
there are already signs that pirates will attempt to expand this
exception.33 While the legislative history of the 1984 amend-
ments makes it clear that the cable satellite programming excep-
tion is specific and limited,335 courts will continue to decide
328. See supra note 50 and note 204.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 200-04.
330. As Senator Goldwater noted, earth station technology has existed for private
home use for only five to six years. 130 CONG. REC. S14283 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984)
(statement of Sen. Goldwater). See supra note 308. Further, he states that:
[i]f our Nation is to hold its lead in this and other areas of high technology, we
must encourage this type of initiative and competition. We cannot favor one tech-
nology over another and we must take care that Government laws do not interfere
with progress and stifle the development of excellent products, such as those rep-
resented by Earth stations at private dwellings. For these reasons, I am pleased
that many of [these] concepts .. .are now incorporated into [§ 705(b)].
130 CONG. REC. S14284 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Goldwater). If "pi-
rate" technology is to be encouraged, then must transmitters continually upgrade tech-
nology to maintain protection? See also text accompanying notes 165-67.
331. See supra note 31.
332. 595 F. Supp. 389 (S.D. Ind. 1984).
333. See supra text accompanying notes 204-05.
334. See supra text accompanying notes 298-99.
335. The legislative history of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, as
printed in the Congressional Record, says in part:
Section 705 will provide a strengthened statutory basis for deterring satellite video
piracy. At the same time, it provides a specific, limited exception under which
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cases based on prior case law as modified by the new section 705
changes."3 6
a. Public Airwaves
Pirates have argued that the "airwaves belong to the pub-
lic," and that they therefore have a right of access to signals
transmitted over public airwaves.3 3 7 In general, courts have re-
sponded by pointing out that while the airwaves belong to the
public, Congress and the FCC are charged with regulating them
in the public interest.33 8 At the same time, some commentators
have argued that such a view is overly simplistic, and thus, does
not adequately reflect a societal view on the rights and interests
of all parties.3 9 However, because Congress is mandated to regu-
late the airwaves in the public interest, any balancing of the
rights and interests of the different parties should be done in
Congress. Therefore, any transmission not protected by section
705 is in the public domain, and as such, can be intercepted and
used with impunity.3,40
b. Free Speech
Because the same equipment used for the unauthorized in-
terception of pay television signals can be used for other legal
purposes, pirates have argued that section 705 protection impli-
cates the free speech provision of the first amendment. 4 In ad-
dition, commentators have argued that the Supreme Court has
recognized a first amendment right to receive information and
ideas.1 2 These commentators suggest that there is a conflict
individual satellite dish owners can be authorized to receive unscrambled signals
without being subject to liability. In that respect, the intent of new section 705 is
the creation of an efficient, non-burdensome marketplace mechanism to author-
ize satellite dish owners to receive unencrypted satellite programming.
130 CONG. REC. S14287 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (Explanation of § 705 as redesignated
and amended by the House of Representatives) (emphasis added).
336. See supra text accompanying notes 286-91.
337. See supra text accompanying notes 139-46.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 139-46.
339. See Comment, Subscription Television: Should the Government Prohibit Un-
authorized Reception?, 18 CAL. W.L. REV. 291, 305 (1982).
340. Accord, Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348, 350 (9th Cir. 1964).
341. See supra text accompanying notes 281-85.
342. See Comment, supra note 339, at 333.
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when the means of communication are protected, such that the
speaker can claim a first amendment right to speak or refrain
from speaking, and the recipient can claim a first amendment
right to receive communications. 4 3 However, the Supreme Court
has noted that "[b]alancing the various First Amendment inter-
ests involved in the broadcast media and determining what best
serves the public's right to be informed is a task of great deli-
cacy and difficulty. 3 44 At the same time, the Court noted "ITihe
First Amendment does not reach acts of private parties in every
instance where the Congress ... has merely permitted or failed
to prohibit such acts. ' 345 In terms of section 705, therefore, it
would seem that Congress has struck a "balance" between what
acts it will permit or prohibit from both transmitters and pi-
rates, and thus, the first amendment should not be construed in
such a way that it defeats this balance.
c. Privacy
Pirates3 46 and at least one commentator3 47 have argued that
the means employed to detect piracy violate the privacy rights
of both pirates and innocent citizens by determining electroni-
cally whether or not a given pay television signal is being re-
ceived.3 48 Although this argument has some merit, it is less per-
suasive when one considers that few such measures are currently
used to detect theft.3 49 It is probably reasonable to assume,
therefore, that as electronic surveillance technology and signal
piracy technology advance, the courts will address this issue and
find a balance, but it may not be in the near future.
343. Id. at 334.
344. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic National Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
102 (1973).
345. Id. at 119.
346. See supra text accompanying notes 195-96.
347. See Comment, supra note 43, at 549 (the court's interpretation of § 605 (in
Heller) is in effect unconstitutional because the means employed to detect piracy vio-
lates the privacy rights of pirates and innocent citizens).
348. Id.
349. See NEW YORK STATE CABLE TELEVISION ASSOCIATION, CABLE THEFT MANUAL
(1983).
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D. Who May Be Liable Under Section 705
Under section 605, equipment manufacturers/sellers as well
as private individual users were held liable for section 605 viola-
tions.3 50 However, in creating a limited exception for private
earth station owners,35 Congress also exempted those who man-
ufactured and sold such equipment to private owners for home
use.3 52 The issue then becomes how far along the continuum of
commerce the exemption continues - since, in any case, it is
the consumer who actually receives and uses the signal.3 53 One
commentator has noted that, under section 605, liability be-
comes increasingly untenable as we proceed along the contin-
uum of commerce away from the consumer who actually receives
the signal.354 The same argument can be made about the exemp-
tion in section 705; as we proceed along the continuum of com-
merce away from the private owner, exemption becomes increas-
ingly strained because the exemption was created to allow for
the private home use of otherwise protected signals. Indeed, it
may be that the same individual who sells earth stations to pri-
vate home viewers also sells to non-private home users, and
thus, some of the equipment ends up in the hands of the unau-
thorized recipients of protected signals. The question then be-
comes whether the seller should be liable for the unauthorized
use of the equipment, and then at what point does liability at-
tach (for example, should a showing of actual knowledge be re-
quired). 55 Further, if all satellite cable programming is either
encrypted or subject to a marketing system, and thus entitled to
section 705(a) protection, will a manufacturer who sells unau-
thorized receiving equipment be immune from liability?
350. See supra text following note 205.
351. See supra note 335.
352. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 705(b), 98
Stat. 2779, 2802 (1984) (set forth in full supra note 239).
353. See Note, Encoded Subscription Television Signals Find Protection Under
Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act - National Subscription Television v.
S & H TV, 4 WHirrIER L. REv. 349 (1982).
354. Id. at 364.
355. See supra text accompanying notes 240 and 268-70. See also Cable Communi-
cations Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 705(d)(c)(ii), 98 Stat. 2779, 2803 (1984);
supra note 241.
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E. The Arguments Against Protection
1. Competition
Pirates have argued that they provide competition for the
transmitters," 6 but courts and commentators alike have gener-
ally found this argument unconvincing because the "competi-
tion" could force the transmitter out of business, through re-
moving the revenue base of the transmitter by enabling the
unauthorized receipt of the signal without payment to the
provider.3 57
2. Antitrust
There have recently been two major cases in which antitrust
claims have been raised by signal pirates. In Ciminelli v.
Cablevision,8 8 the plaintiff signal pirate argued that the restric-
tions imposed on the sale of equipment designed to receive a
cable television signal, constituted illegal tying under the anti-
trust laws.5 9 More recently, in Air Capital Cablevision, 3  de-
fendant earth station distributors argued that the plaintiff cable
operators brought the suit as part of an attempt at monopoliza-
tion.3 61 In evaluating these two antitrust claims, it is necessary
to look at what is protected by section 705 and whether there is
a business justification for limiting receiving equipment.
In Goldman v. United States,32 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit examined whether overhearing and divulging
the contents of what was said into a telephone receiver consti-
tuted a violation of section 605 (now section 705(a)). 63 In deny-
ing protection, the Goldman court held that section 605 pro-
tected the telephone lines as the "means of communication," not
the "secrecy of the conversation." 36 As such, protection is af-
356. See supra text accompanying note 150.
357. See Comment, supra note 339 at 315. See also Bienstock, supra note 18, at 244
n.2.
358. 583 F. Supp. 158 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
359. See supra text accompanying notes 176-82.
360. 601 F. Supp. 1568 (D. Kan. 1985).
361. See supra text accompanying notes 274-77.
362. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
363. Id. at 133.
364. Id.
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forded to the message "throughout the course of its transmission
by the instrumentality or agency of transmission. "365 Applying
these findings to Air Capital, it is clear that what the cable op-
erators sought to protect was the "secrecy of the conversation"
(the transmission they received from the satellite), and not the
"means of communication" (the security of the cable system). 66
Because the cable operators' ability to protect the signal in the
cable system was not implicated, the cable operators did not
have a valid claim under either section 605 or section 705. In
order to have a valid section 605 or section 705 claim, the opera-
tors needed an interception of their signal as it was transmitted
across the cable.
On the other hand, when one examines the Ciminelli case in
light of the Goldman distinction between the "secrecy of the
conversation" and the "means of communication," Ciminelli
yields the opposite result. In Ciminelli, the defendant cable op-
erators argued that there was a business justification for any
"tying" arrangement involving cable related equipment, because
cable operators needed such an arrangement to protect their
transmission.-61 Because the cable operators sought only to pro-
tect themselves by controlling equipment that could be used on
their cable system ("means of communication"), they did not go
beyond the ambit of section 605 (now section 705(a)) by seeking
to protect the "secrecy of the conversation" beyond that portion
of it which they originated. Further, given the difficulty of de-
tecting signal pirates s6 s and the improbability of a pirate turning
himself in,'69 it would appear that there is a business justifica-
tion for limiting the sale of unauthorized equipment.
Thus, Goldman provides an appropriate basis on which to
distinguish between what means may be necessary and proper to
protect transmissions under section 705.
365. Id.
366. See supra text accompanying notes 278-79.
367. See supra text accompanying notes 180-82.
368. See Comment, supra note 339, at 341 (noting that the problem lies in the pub-
lic's desire to cooperate with the pirates).
369. See American Television & Com. Corp. v. Western Techtronics, Inc., 524 F.
Supp. 617, 621 (D. Colo. 1982) ("those persons intercepting the MDS signals without
paying for them are not likely to volunteer that they are doing so, since criminal penal-
ties are provided for willfully violating § 605 [now § 705(a)]").
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IV. Conclusion
In Hoosier Home Theater, Inc. v. Adkins,3 70 Judge Barker
concluded that:
since 1980, the amount of law on [unauthorized reception of sub-
scription television signals] has increased but the public under-
standing of these statutes and their interpretations seems none-
theless to have lagged. [The] Court is faced, therefore, with a
situation where its function is as much to explain the applicable
law, as to decide the immediate controversy. In doing so, and pri-
marily because of the problems which enforcement of the rights
protected by Section [7051 portends, it is hoped that this ruling
will serve as an aid to understanding by those who otherwise
would err through inadvertence or confusion and a deterrent to
those who otherwise would allow themselves to be in violation of
these statutes.3 71
While section 705 changed the law on the unauthorized recep-
tion of pay television signals, it carved out only a narrow excep-
tion by allowing private home use of individual earth stations
within certain guidelines (where the signal was neither en-
crypted nor a marketing system established allowing for author-
ized use by individual private home users). In amending section
605, Congress created a balance between the rights of different
parties, weighing current realities such as the widespread use of
private home earth stations with the public interest in the con-
tinuing economic viability of the pay television industry and
that industry's need to protect its signal. The federal courts
have created a balance between ensuring the continued viability
of pay television operations through protection of transmissions,
while taking into account the other policy considerations (such
as antitrust) which serve to limit the availability of protection,
in a consistent line of cases under section 605 and section 705. It
is hoped that the federal courts will continue to maintain this
balance, and that the state courts will interpret state laws to
maintain a similar balance.
Susan M. Hart
370. 595 F. Supp. 389 (S.D. Ind. 1984).
371. Id. at 399.
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